šŗšø One thingās certain: For better and worse, Trump is still the same charismatic, narcissistic, impulsive, transactional leader he was four years ago (albeit a little slower). But even though Trump the person hasnāt changed since 2020, the world around him has become dramatically more dangerous.
Some will point out that as president from 2017-2021, Trump was able to score some notable foreign-policy successes, including a revitalized North American free trade agreement, the Abraham Accords, fairer cost-sharing among NATO members, and new and stronger security alliances in Asia. Itās also true that this happened amid a generally benign and peaceful international environment, at least before the COVID-19 pandemic started near the end of his term
A second Trump presidency will inevitably shake up the Middle Eastās political calculations, with Gulf states, Jordan, and others already preparing for what could be a significant shift in U.S. foreign policy. While Trumpās first term brought a mix of hardline policies and transactional diplomacy, his potential return signals a landscape where self-reliance and strategic pragmatism will dominate. Hereās how itās likely to play out.
š In the Middle East, Trump could play a stabilizing role. The Abraham Accords, probably seen from the US as the biggest foreign policy achievement of his first term, normalized relations between Israel and several Arab countries (a thought not widely shared by Arabs and people of the region not directly involved in the agreement), sparking hope for a more stable region (However, this is still viewed with some amount of healthy skepticism). (They also exposed the indifference that Arab governments feel toward the Palestinians, whose plight was largely decoupled from the agreements.) While Hamasā Oct. 7 attacks and the crushing Israeli response to them have put this hope ā and the prospect that even Saudi Arabia might cut a breakthrough deal with Israel ā on hold, Trumpās transactional nature and strong relationships with deep-pocketed Gulf leaders could revive this possibility (if a lame duck Biden doesnāt get there firstā¦).
The flipside is that Trumpās lack of inhibition about using military force against Iran ā remember his administrationās targeted assassination of Iranian defense chief Qasem Soleimani?ācould also create wildcard risks, most notably inadvertent escalation from autonomous Iranian proxies or a desperate or emboldened Israeli government. But as the last several months have shown, Tehran itself has no interest in a dangerous direct war with either the US or Israel that it canāt win, particularly when a loss would destabilize the economy, jeopardize recently normalized relations with the Gulf Arabs, and precipitate a crisis at home. So even here, Trumpās risky approach is more likely than not to result in de-escalation and regional stability.
šøš¦ The Gulf: Balancing U.S. Security Ties with Strategic Autonomy
The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) statesāparticularly Saudi Arabia and the UAEāhave spent years recalibrating their strategies, combining a cautious embrace of Trumpās transactional style with efforts to diversify alliances.
Gulf statesā¦do not want to be viewed through the lens of so-called āgreat power competitionā ā or forced to choose between them.
1. The Abraham Accords:
The first Trump term witnessed the historic signing of the Abraham Accords, normalizing relations between Israel and the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan. These agreements realigned Middle Eastern diplomacy but left deeper issues unresolved. With Saudi Arabia considering joining the accords, Trumpās potential return could reignite negotiations. However, Riyadh has made it clear that any normalization must address Palestinian statehood. This, however, is mainly only a facade aimed at growing discontent within their younger population (60% of which is below the age of 30), who are seeing Israeli brutality onfold in real time against the Palestinians in Gaza. Their real motivation however, is a broader security agreement that would put the Saudis firmly under American military umbrella, akin to bilateral agreements the Americans have with Israel, South Korea, and Taiwan.
2. U.S.-Saudi Security Pact:
Saudi Arabia has actively sought a formal U.S. security guarantee, potentially modeled on NATO-style agreements, in exchange for further cooperation with Washington and Israel. The kingdom views such a deal as critical to countering regional threats, especially from Iran. Recent reports suggest that Saudi leaders are pressing the Biden administration for clearer commitments, and Trumpās return could alter the dynamics of these talks.
For historical perspective, in 1945, amid the chaos of World War II, the American president Franklin D. Roosevelt famously met with King Abdulaziz of Saudi Arabia aboard the U.S.S Quincy. There, Roosevelt and Saud concluded a secret agreement in which the U.S. would provide Saudi Arabia military security in exchange for secure access to supplies of oil. So what changed, you might ask? Well, the Americans in the early 2010s discovered vast reserves of Shale Gas (that was dubbed theāshale revolutionā at the time), alowing them, for the first time in their history, to be energy self-reliant and a net expoter of oil & gas rather than rely on Saudi flow. That changed the whole equation for Arab countries.
3. Military Spending and Arms Deals:
Saudi Arabia remains the largest arms importer globally, with 23% of all global arms sales directed to the kingdom between 2016 and 2020. Under Trump, the U.S. approved deals worth over $110 billion, including advanced missile systems and fighter jets. If Trump resumes office, expect Riyadh to continue leveraging military purchases to solidify ties with Washington.
4. Dialogue with Iran:
Riyadh and Tehran have cautiously reopened dialogue, with China acting as a mediator. However, renewed U.S. pressure on Iran under Trump could destabilize these efforts. As one Gulf diplomat noted, āWeāre prepared for Trumpās unpredictability, but we must safeguard our regional autonomy.ā Iran, which has seen itās entire 40 year strategy crumble since the 7th of October, is left with few palatable choices:
Pursue their nuclear weapons program
Negotiate with the US on a broader security agreement in the region.
Itās crucial to keep in mind, that Iran sees itself as a regional power and will not accept being robbed of their role in the region by the Americans. It, however, cannot openly engage or confront an increasingly beligerent Israel, leaving it in a bind.
šÆš“ Jordan: Walking a Diplomatic Tightrope
Jordanās relevance to the US will diminish for at least another four years ā and the consequences will be more far-reaching this time around.
Jordanās reliance on the U.S. for aid and security underscores its vulnerability to shifts in Washingtonās policy. Trumpās past disregard for Palestinian rights, such as relocating the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem, directly undermined Jordanās role as custodian of Jerusalemās Islamic and Christian holy sites. A role, it has unofficially relinquished since the ISraeli capture of Jerusalem in the 1967 war.
Palestinian Marginalization:
Trumpās unrelenting support for Israel emboldened right-wing Israeli leaders to expand settlements, exacerbating tensions in the West Bank. Jordan has warned that further marginalization of Palestinians could destabilize the region, threatening its own security. The reason why, is that Jordanians of Palestinian descent compose a singificant part of the population. A further increase in that ratio, letās say by pushing the population of the West Bank into Jordan, as has been advocated by extreme right-wing members of the Israeli government like Smotrich and Ben-Gvir, would potentially be an enormous security risk for Jordan and its monarchy.
Aid Dependency:
Jordan is among the top recipients of U.S. aid, receiving $1.65 billion annually, including $425 million in military support. A Trump-led shift in aid priorities could strain Ammanās already fragile economy.
š®š· Iran and Its Proxies: Preparing for "Maximum Pressure" 2.0
A second Trump term would likely intensify pressure on Iran, leading to broader regional ramifications. The āmaximum pressureā campaign during Trumpās first term crippled Iranās economy, slashing oil exports from 2.8 million barrels per day in 2018 to under 400,000 barrels by 2020. However, it also pushed Tehran to double down on its support for regional proxies. Trump has recently suggested a return to.a maximum pressure campaign, although details about what this entails or towards what end goal, have yet to be shared.
Groups like the Axis of Resistanceā¦are part of the decision-making structures of statesā¦including Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Iran, and Yemen.Ā
š±š§ Hezbollah in Lebanon:
Hezbollahās reliance on Iranian funding has made it a target of U.S. sanctions. Yet, the group remains influential, not to say hegemonic in Lebanese politics, controlling key government ministries and maintaining its military presence. If sanctions tighten, Hezbollah might escalate tensions with Israel to divert attention, as noted in GZeroās breakdown of Trumpās foreign policy. Both Israle and Hezbollah are relunctant to engage in ceasefire talks (albeit for different reasons). Israel think it can continuously move the goal post while it has Hezbollah on the backfoot and before the Trump administration takes office in January 2025, and Hezbollah cannot accept unconditional terms of surrender as it would signal the political end of the militant group
š®š¶ š¾šŖIraq and Yemen:
Trumpās policies emboldened Iranās proxies in Iraq, like Kataāib Hezbollah, and in Yemen, where the Houthis continue to challenge Saudi forces. Renewed sanctions could intensify these proxy conflicts, destabilizing critical trade routes in the Gulf.
š®š± Israel: Expanding the Abraham Accords
Israelās alignment with Trumpās policies transformed the regionās dynamics. Recognizing Jerusalem as its capital, endorsing West Bank settlements, and supporting military campaigns in Gaza underscored Trumpās unflinching support. A second term would likely:
Aggressively Expand the Accords: Trump could pressure Saudi Arabia and others to formalize ties with Israel, offering economic incentives or arms deals.
Increase Settlement Expansion: Israeli leaders might interpret Trumpās return as a green light for more aggressive settlement policies, further alienating Palestinians and destabilizing Jordan, as observed in the Chatham House analysis.
Broader Consequences for the Region
The ripple effects of Trump 2.0 wonāt stop with individual nationsātheyāll cascade across the Middle East:
Economic Impact: U.S. sanctions on Iran could disrupt oil exports, affecting global energy prices. Saudi Arabiaās diversification efforts, while promising, remain vulnerable to shifts in global demand.
Geopolitical Realignment: China and Russia will likely capitalize on U.S. disengagement, deepening ties with Iran and Gulf states, as explained in Ian Bremmerās analysis of the global landscape.
A Region in Flux
The Middle East is no stranger to uncertainty, but the possibility of a second Trump presidency brings unique challenges. From reshaping alliances to navigating a volatile geopolitical landscape, regional leaders must prepare for a future where U.S. engagement is both a boon and a threat.
As one Gulf insider summarized, āThe only thing predictable about Trump is his unpredictability. Weāve learned to survive it before; weāll learn again.ā
In a world where the rules are rewritten daily, the Middle East is bracing for another wild ride under Trump. Whether through self-reliance, strategic hedging, or sheer resilience, the region's leaders are preparing for what comes nextāand theyāre doing it on their own terms.